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Self-Determination and Ideality in Hegel's Logic of Being
Brady Bowman
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Being Thought and Thinking Being in Hegel's Science of Logic (Complete Dissertation)
Thomas F Whaling
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Commentary on Hegel's Logic 1: Prefaces and Introduction
Ilmari Jauhiainen
Phenomenology of spirit. Although I cannot proclaim to be nearly as good a Hegel-scholar as Harris is, I still thought it worth the effort to express my thoughts and interpretations of Science of logic in a study analysing each paragraph and then explaining it in more detail, as best as I could.
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Subjective Logic and the Unity of Thought and Being: Hegel's Logical Reconstruction of Aristotle's Speculative Empiricism
Paul M Redding
Dina Edmunts and Sally Sedgwick (eds), Internationales Jahrbuch des Deutschen Idealismus, vol. 12: Logic., 2017
Interpreters disagree over whether the categories or “thought determinations” of Hegel’s Objective Logic should be construed as, following Aristotle, fundamentally about being, or, following Kant, fundamentally about thought. Moreover, they disagree over the relation that Objective Logic stands to Subjective Logic, which inturn involves its own transition to “objectivity”. This paper focuses on Hegel’s Subjective Logic as charting a process in which a logic initially understood as subjective and formal, after the manner of Kant, comes to acquire content, issuing in a type of unity of thought and being of which the earlier Objective Logic was incapable. In particular, Hegel’s account of judgment and syllogism can be read as a critical reinterpretation of the logic governing the passage from experience to “ideas” in Aristotle’s account of epagoge or “induction”.
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Hegel's Critique of Kant's Concept of Reason: The Problem of Different Demands
Michael Lewin
Hegel-Jahrbuch 2019, 2020
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Hegel's Doctrine Of Being: Showing Another Access to Absolute Mind From A Study Of His Metaphysics, Dialectic, And Logic
Todd R Rossman
Hegel's systematic treatment of the Doctrine of Being in his Science of Logic is characteristic of his methodology involving abstract ideas and logic. The dialectical method used in place of all other classical philosophical apparatus has caused for many, including this researcher, confusion. This paper shall investigate the basis, nature and implementation of Hegel's dialectical method within his Metaphysics and Logic. His Logic and metaphysics are one and the same, and for those who are not accustomed to the organic, mediated methodology, the paradoxes can often loose the inattentive scholar far behind. This inattentiveness also has led to inappropriate criticisms, which shall be seen later. This author will provide another development from the Hegelian dialectic that compliments or employs this method or one which can be separate and univocal.
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The Doctrine of Being in Hegel's Science of Logic: A Critical Commentary
Mehmet Tabak
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Kant, Hegel, and The Two Competing Nineteenth-Century Revolutions in Logic (Draft
Paul M Redding
A paradox generated by Robert Pippin’s approach to interpreting Hegel’s “science of pure thinking” is used to reflect upon the nature of Hegel’s understanding of the nature of judgment. Pippin wants to follow McDowell’s suggestions concerning the “unboundedness of the conceptual” realm, inspired by Wittgenstein’s claim that ‘When we say, and mean, that such-and-such is the case, we—and our meaning—do not stop anywhere short of the fact, but we mean: this-is-so”. However, McDowell’s account had been developed in the context of perceptual knowledge claims, whereas the metaphysical knowledge claims implicit in the Logic are a priori and hold independently of any empirical knowledge. It is argued here that the paradox is dissolved by uncoupling Hegel’s position from the Kantian and Fregean presuppositions implicit in McDowell’s reading. Wittgenstein’s sentence, when read from the perspective of a logic with dual judgment forms would count as what Boole had called a secondary, or abstract proposition, rather than as an expression of perceptual experience. Hegel’s account of judgment shows a similar duality in contrast to Frege’s univocal account. When this categorical distinction between singularity and particularity that underlies this duality is seen as applied to the world, as in his Philosophy of Nature, the “unboundedness of the conceptual” can be understood as having a different meaning to the way in which it is taken by McDowell.
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Hegels revisions of the Doctrine of Being
Cinzia Ferrini
to be published in Rivista di Storia della Filosofia , 2020
This essay aims to demonstrate a clear and significant difference, not merely expository revisions or additions, in the logical progression of Being between Hegel's two main versions of the Doctrine of Being (1812-1817 and 1827-1830, 1832). This controversial issue is analysed by retracing and examining changes that international scholarship still widely neglects. Focussing on Hegel's introduction of the doubled transition of Quality and Quantity in the genesis of Measure, the essay argues that the main point of the revisions is that Hegel views the whole determinateness of Being as self-sublating its own externality, because in one determination of Being passing into another one, the first does not vanish; instead, both remain within their relational unity. Hegel's new version of the genesis of Measure indicates an essentially qualitative appreciation of the quantitative methods of the empirical sciences. This accords with Hegel's growing acknowledgment in Berlin of the independent cognitive status of the natural sciences in regard to philosophy, and with his reassessment of the relation among intuition, representation and conceptual cognition of the objects of consciousness, to do justice to their real differences and their being for themselves within their own existence.
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Sublating Kant and the Old Metaphysics: A Reading of the Transition from Being to Essence in Hegel’s Logic
Michael Baur
The Owl of Minerva, 1998
Kant’s “transcendental” or “critical” philosophy is an instance of what can be called the “critique of immediacy.” As part of his critical project, Kant argues that one cannot merely assume that there is a reestablished harmony between thought and being. Instead, one must effect a “return to the subject” and examine the forms of thought themselves, in order to determine the extent to which thought and being are commensurable. As a result of his “transcendental turn,” Kant concludes that what at first appears as immediately given to thought is always already (at least partly) the result of some kind of activity or mediation on the part of the thought itself. Hegel approves of Kant’s critical orientation: Kant correctly demanded to know “how far the forms of thought were capable of leading to the knowledge of truth,” and correctly concluded that “the forms of thought must be made into an object of investigation.” However, for Hegel, the problem with Kant was that he aimed to examine the forms of thought as if they were necessarily separated from being itself. Thus the Kantian strategy, for Hegel, led to a twofold absurdly.
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